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 Introduction
• In 2011, we developed a System Safety 
Framework under which system safety 
activities are conducted and communicated
• The core elements of the framework are:
– Safety objectives
– System safety activities
– Risk-Informed Safety Case (RISC)
– Evaluation of RISC
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• Explanation of the framework and its core elements are contained 
in:
NASA/SP-2010-580: NASA System Safety Handbook Volume 1:
System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation
• NASA System Safety Standard and Volume 2 of the handbook are 
currently in development
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 Motivation
• Development of the System Safety Framework is motivated by 
a desire to:
– Foster objectives-driven analysis and execution of system safety 
activities (as opposed to techniques- or product-driven 
approaches)  
– Foster integrated, holistic view of safety to address system-level 
considerations (recognition that safety is an emergent property)
– Establish a process for defining “adequate safety” 
– Codify expected safety performance, so that later monitoring and 
precursor analysis activities have a baseline 
– Establish a means for presenting a coherent case for the safety 
of the system to decision makers
– Establish a process that is compatible with the growing trend 
toward relying on commercial providers for transportation of 
crew and cargo
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 1. System Safety Objectives (Defined by Acquirer)
– Development of safety objectives that collectively define adequate safety for a system
2. System safety processes (Achieved by Provider)
– Conduct of safety activities that are implemented to achieve defined safety objectives
3. RISC Development (Argued by Provider)
– Substantiation of claims that the safety objectives of the system have been met, or are 
on track to being met, within the specific decision context 
4. RISC Evaluation (Confirmed by or on behalf of Acquirer)
– Evaluation of RISC in order to accept the current or forecasted safety performance of 
the system as well as the risk that its realized safety performance might be less than 
its claimed performance
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Safety Objectives
 What is Safety?
• The specific scope of safety is application-specific, and must 
be clearly defined by the stakeholders in terms of the entities 
to which it applies and the consequences against which it is 
assessed
• The degree of safety that is considered acceptable is also 
application-specific
– We strive to attain a degree of safety that fulfills obligations to 
the at-risk communities and addresses agency priorities
– We do not expect to attain absolute safety (nor consider it 
possible to do so)
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“Safety is freedom from those conditions that can cause
death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of
equipment or property, or damage to the environment”
NPR 8715.3
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 Adequate Safety
• Achieving an adequately safe system requires adherence to the following 
fundamental safety principles:
– The system meets or exceeds a minimum tolerable level of safety. Below this 
level the system is considered unsafe
– The system is as safe as reasonably practicable (ASARP)
• The minimum tolerable level of safety is not necessarily static, and may 
evolve over the course of the system life cycle
• The principles of adequate safety must be maintained throughout all 
phases of the system life cycle
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 Safety Thresholds & Goals
• NASA’s minimum level of tolerable safety for human spaceflight 
missions is articulated in NASA’s agency-level safety goals and 
thresholds for crew transportation system missions to the ISS
• They reflect a tolerance for an initial safety performance that is 
acceptable initially but below long-term expectations
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 Being As Safe As Reasonably Practicable
• The ASARP concept is closely related to the “as low as reasonably 
achievable” (ALARA) and “as low as reasonably practicable” (ALARP) 
concepts that are found in U.S. nuclear applications and U.K. Health and 
Safety law
• ASARP implies that:
– The performance of each alternative has been analyzed to determine the relative 
gains and losses in performance (technical, safety, cost, and schedule) that 
would result from selecting one alternative over another
– Safety performance is given priority in the selection of an alternative, insofar as 
the selection is within tolerable limits of cost/schedule/technical performance
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“ASARP entails weighing the safety performance of a
system against the sacrifice needed to further improve
it. A system is ASARP if an incremental improvement in
safety would require a disproportionate deterioration of
system performance in other areas.”
From SS Handbook
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 Being As Safe As Reasonably Practicable (cont.)
• ASARP reflects a mindset of continuous safety improvement 
regardless of the current level of safety
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 Deriving Operational Safety Objectives
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• The fundamental safety principles set the stage for the further 
development of safety objectives, negotiated on an 
application-specific basis
• Safety objectives are developed using an objectives hierarchy 
down to a level where they can be clearly addressed by 
systems safety activities, thereby creating a link that:
– Assures that system safety activities are directed towards 
accomplishing defined safety objectives
– Enables the system safety activities to be assessed in terms of 
the degree to which their target safety objectives have been met
• The safety objectives at the bottom level of the objectives 
hierarchy represent the operational definition of safety for the 
system under consideration, and are referred to as 
operational safety objectives
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 Deriving Operational Safety Objectives
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 Characterizing the Actual Risk of a System
• Safety goals and thresholds represent expectations about 
actual risk, including both known and 
unknown/underappreciated  (UU) sources
– Known sources of risk are amenable to explicit quantification via 
synthetic, scenario-based methods of analysis (e.g., PRA), and 
actuarial methods (when sufficient data are available)
– UU sources of risk are not amenable to synthetic analysis or direct 
actuarial characterization, yet are historically recognized as 
significant contributors to risk
• They tend to remain latent in the system until revealed by 
operational failures, precursor analysis, etc.
• They tend to be most significant early in the system life cycle
• They disproportionally reflect complex intra-system and 
environmental interactions
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 Characterizing the Actual Risk of a System
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How should we characterize the contribution 
of  UU scenarios to actual risk?
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 How to Characterize the Contribution of UU 
Scenarios to Actual Risk
• One possible approach is imbedded in the concept of safety 
performance margin (referred to in the System Safety 
Handbook as safety risk reserve). 
• In this approach, the actual risk of a system is understood to be 
the sum of the risk from known scenarios, as explicitly 
quantified using traditional risk analysis methods, plus the risk 
from UU scenarios, as characterized by the safety performance 
margin. 
• The limit on the allowable explicitly quantified risk can be 
derived by subtracting (in risk terms) the safety performance 
margin from the minimum tolerable level of safety. 
• If the explicitly quantified risk is within this limit, then by 
implication there is reasonable assurance that the actual risk is 
within the minimum tolerable level of safety
• Methods for establishing an initial safety performance margin 
and a margin draw-down profile based on historical data for 
similar systems are currently being investigated by OSMA
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 Conceptual View of Managing Safety Performance 
Consistent with the Minimum Tolerable Level of Safety
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System Safety Activities
 System Safety Activities
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• The handbook takes the approach that system safety informs
systems engineering and risk management, but does not directly 
engineer the system or manage risk
• System Safety Activities
– Are conducted as part of overall systems engineering / risk 
management
– Are focused on achieving a system that meets the operational safety 
objectives
• The system safety framework recognizes the need for flexibility 
in the nature and composition of SS activities, so long as 
objectives are met
• Integrated safety analysis (ISA) is the central system safety 
activity
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 Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA)
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• There are system safety activities that support the ISA
– Uncertainty reduction (e.g., testing, performance monitoring, 
Accident Precursor Analysis)
• There are system safety activities that are supported by the ISA
– System design, requirements development, requirements 
verification, performance monitoring, program control and 
commitments
• A graded approach to ISA  
– Comprehensive identification of “hazard scenarios” (i.e., deviations 
from the envelope of normal operation) using qualitative techniques 
– Detailed analysis of “accident scenarios” (i.e., the subset of the 
hazard scenarios that produce accident conditions) using 
quantitative techniques
– Identification and management of high-priority controls based on 
their credited effectiveness in the ISA (capability, reliability, 
availability)
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 System Safety Activities (Early Design)
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Risk-Informed Safety Case (RISC)
 Risk-Informed Safety Case (RISC)
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“A risk-informed safety case (RISC) is a structured
argument, supported by a body of evidence, that
provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case
that a system is or will be adequately safe for a given
application in a given environment. This is
accomplished by addressing each of the operational
safety objectives that have been negotiated for the
system, including articulation of the roadmap for the
achievement of safety objectives that are applicable to
later phases of the system life cycle.”
From SS Handbook
• The term ‘risk-informed’ is used to emphasize that adequate safety is 
the result of a deliberative decision making process that involves an 
assessment of risks, and strives for a proper balance between safety 
performance and performance in other mission execution domains
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 RISC Life Cycle Considerations
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• The RISC (produced by the system provider) addresses the full 
system life cycle, regardless of the particular point in the life cycle at 
which the RISC is developed. This results in two types of safety 
claims:
– Claims related to the safety objectives of the current or previous phases 
argue that the objectives have been met
– Claims related to the safety objectives of future phases argue that 
necessary planning and preparation have been conducted, and that 
commitments are in place to satisfy the objectives at the appropriate time
Presented by Homayoon Dezfuli
 25
Evaluation of RISC
 Evaluation of the RISC
• Acquisition of a system that needs to satisfy safety objectives 
needs to entail demonstration of the satisfaction of those 
safety objectives and associated requirements
• The mechanism for this demonstration is the RISC that is 
delivered by the system provider
• The acquirer needs to address the risk that the level of safety 
realized in the system is worse than claimed in the safety case. 
The acquirer must either accept this risk, or reject the system.
• In principle, then, the acquirer must evaluate the RISC in 
sufficient depth to co-own the uncertainty in safety 
performance
• This does not mean that the acquirer must redo the safety 
analysis. 
• It does mean that the acquirer’s decision needs to be based on 
– the acquirer’s assessment of the analysis processes, and 
– the acquirer’s sense of the strength of the evidence presented, including 
prior information such as historical experience with the technology
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 Distinguishing “Safety Performance Risk” From 
“Programmatic Risk” via an Example
• A program requires a launch vehicle having P(loss on launch)  1E-3. This implies 
that the top-level program authority has decided that P(loss on launch)   1E-3 can 
be accepted (assuming other objectives are met). This value is furnished as a 
threshold to the provider by the acquiring organization
– Provider-assessed safety performance: 7E-4
– Programmatic risk for the acceptor: Probability that the actual P(loss) is 
higher than 7E-4. (In particular, there is a risk that it is higher than the 1E-3 
threshold)
• The acquiring organization must decide whether to accept the system, as well as 
the programmatic risk, in part by analyzing the probability that P(loss) > 1E-3
– This includes an evaluation of the provider’s analysis
– This includes an evaluation of the provider as well (design philosophy, 
organizational factors, programmatic factors, etc.)
• An evaluation protocol is needed for assessing the programmatic risk that P(loss 
on launch) > 1E-3
• The evaluation can yield one of three possible results:
– sufficiently confident that P(loss on launch)  1E-3
– insufficiently confident that P(loss on launch)  1E-3
– confident that P(loss on launch) > 1E-3
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 Potential Applicability of NASA STD-7009
• NASA STD-7009 
contains an appendix 
describing a 
“Credibility 
Assessment Scale,” or 
CAS, intended to guide 
prospective users of 
modeling and 
simulation results
• The CAS consists of 8 
factors that are used to 
determine whether the 
credibility of the 
analysis used to 
support decision 
making is at least equal 
to the expectations of 
the DM
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Summing it All Up
 Summary
• An adequately safe system should adhere to two fundamental principles
– Meeting or exceeding the minimum tolerable level of safety 
– Being ASARP
• Completeness issues associated with synthetic risk analysis methods should 
be formally addressed
– Safety risk margin is proposed as one way to account for this
• Integrated safety analysis is the central system safety activity
– System safety uses the ISA to inform systems engineering and risk management 
decisions, but does not directly engineer the system or manage risk
• The RISC makes the coherent case that the system is safe for the intended 
application
– The RISC serves as a comprehensive proxy for the safety of the system
– The safety of the system relative to goals/thresholds is one element of the RISC
– The RISC is not a radically new idea.  It is a formalization and integration of 
processes and ideas that are already in place or being incorporated to support a 
certification process
• Evaluation protocols are needed for evaluating RISCs
– The acquiring organization must accept (or not) the programmatic risk that the 
system’s actual safety performance is not as good as its characterization in the RISC
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